

context of pan-Arabism thus provided Zionism with a moral justification for the transfer of the "Arabs" of Palestine to neighboring Arab territories.

The argument that the Palestinians should move out of what should become the Jewish state and be subsumed in the Arab world underpinned the Zionist transfer plans of the 1930s and 1940s. This conception was predicated on the contradictory notion that the Arab national question in Palestine could be somehow detached from the demands of Arab nationalism regarding Palestine, and that the latter could simultaneously subsume the Palestinian Arabs. And although the events in Palestine and the Middle East at large underlined pan-Arabism's opposition to the Zionist colonization of Palestine, the Yishuv leaders continued to canvass privately with Arab leaders in the hope of accomplishing a transfer of Palestine's Arab population.

Zionist attempts to reach agreement with Arab leaders generally consisted in offering benefits—in terms of finance, expertise, or international influence—in exchange for acquiescence in the expansion of the Yishuv in Palestine and, later, for assistance in absorbing the anticipated Arab transferees. This strategic approach continued during the 1930s and beyond with secret initiatives promoting transfer schemes by Jewish Agency leaders' with Emir Abdallah of Transjordan, Ibn Saud, and Iraqi politicians.

But there were important precedents even before that time. The most prominent, certainly, was the January 1919 agreement between Chaim Weizmann and the Hashemite Emir Faisal, aspirant to leadership of the Arab nationalist movement. According to the agreement, concluded under British auspices in the presence of T.E. Lawrence, Faisal would support Jewish immigration into Palestine on the basis of the Balfour Declaration, while the Zionist Organization would provide economic experts to the Arab state Faisal sought to create. Although the agreement does not mention transfer, it nonetheless serves as a kind of prototype of attempted Zionist deals in that it involves an ex-

change of Zionist assistance for Arab acquiescence in Zionist goals.

Another attempted deal, this one backed by Baron Edmond-James de Rothschild, the French financier and patron of the early Zionist colonies, was discussed in 1929. The plan, though apparently not broached with Arab leaders, nonetheless involved precisely the same principle. Following a meeting with de Rothschild in Paris, Vladimir Jabotinsky wrote in a letter to a friend that the Baron "...is willing to give money to the Arabs in order to enable them to purchase other lands, but on condition that they leave Palestine..."<sup>54</sup>

Referring to de Rothschild's plan, Shabtai Levi of Haifa, who had been a land purchasing agent of the organization founded by the Baron, the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PICA), wrote in his memoirs:

He advised me to carry on in similar activities, but it is better, he said, not to transfer the Arabs to Syria and Transjordan, as these are part of the Land of Israel, but to Mesopotamia (Iraq). He added that in these cases he would be ready to send the Arabs, at his expense, new agricultural machines, and agricultural advisers.<sup>55</sup>

The same basic elements—a Zionist free hand in Palestine in exchange for Jewish help in settling the Palestinians elsewhere—were present in Ben-Gurion's proposal to the Palestinian leader Musa al-Alami on 31 August 1934, at the latter's village near Jerusalem.<sup>56</sup> Ben-Gurion noted in his diary his proposal that Palestine and Transjordan should be reconstituted as a single Jewish state linked to a federation of Arab states, an arrangement that would ensure "unlimited [Jewish] immigration and settlement in Transjordan."<sup>57</sup> According to Alami's account of the meeting, Ben-Gurion suggested that "if the Arabs would leave Palestine and Transjordan to the Jews, they [the Arabs] could count on Jewish help, not only in resettling the displaced Palestinians, but for Arab causes in other countries."<sup>58</sup> Ben-Gurion reported, for his part, that Alami voiced *inter alia* his apprehensions regarding the fate of the Palestinians in the Jewish

state. Since they were largely farmers, they would be dispossessed, and "without land, the Arabs will have nothing to do" because of the Yishuv's policy of employing exclusively "Jewish labor" and of excluding Arabs from the Jewish economy.

Ben-Gurion replied that Zionist policy was against creating a situation such as prevailed in South Africa, where the whites were the owners and rulers and the blacks were workers. Echoing Herzl's earlier expressed desire to "spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our country," Ben-Gurion stated that Zionist colonization and economic expansion would create "opportunities for Arab employment, not only in Palestine, but throughout the Arab federation."<sup>59</sup> Thus, in order to avoid replicating the South African model of a colonial society living off the economic exploitation of the indigenous population and at the same time to solve the problem of "Hebrew Labor," the Yishuv would encourage the Palestinians to look for employment (created by Zionist enterprise) and, consequently, residency (a discreet transfer process) in an Arab country such as Iraq.

Even as Zionist leaders were searching for solutions to the "Arab problem" within the wider Arab framework, concrete steps were being taken on the ground to facilitate implementation of whatever solutions might be found. Throughout the Mandatory period the Zionist Yishuv advanced along its own political trajectories. Its goal of building "a national home in Palestine for the Jewish people" was the determining factor in its dealings with the indigenous population: once the idea of Jewish statehood as a precondition for the "ingathering of exiles" and creating a Jewish majority in Palestine took hold, there was little scope for compromise with the Palestinian Arab majority to be displaced.

The growing Palestinian resistance to Zionist aims, culminating in the 1936-39 Arab rebellion, was met by re-

doubled Zionist determination to implement the fundamental doctrine of separation between the Yishuv and Palestinian Arabs. The means of achieving this doctrine were "redemption" or "conquest" (the terms used by the Zionists themselves) of "Hebrew Land" and "Hebrew Labor," by which is meant, respectively, the acquisition of land exclusively for Jewish use and the exclusive employment of Jewish workers on Zionist-owned land or enterprises. "If we want Hebrew redemption 100%, then we must have a 100% Hebrew settlement, a 100% Hebrew farm, and a 100% Hebrew port," declared Ben-Gurion at a meeting of the Va'ad Leumi, the Yishuv's National Council, on 5 May 1936.<sup>60</sup> Two weeks later, on 19 May, the transfer issue was raised at a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive, effectively the Yishuv's leadership.

The doctrines of "Hebrew Land" and "Hebrew Labor" dated back to the early years of Zionist colonization. One of the provisions of the Jewish National Fund, established in 1901 as the land acquisition and administration arm of the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency and by far the largest Jewish landowner in Palestine, was that any land it acquired was to be held in perpetual trust for the Jewish people. Such land was inalienable, and non-Jewish labor was not allowed on it.

The struggle to enforce the doctrine of exclusive "Hebrew Labor" intensified after the 1929 Wailing Wall riots, when the Histadrut, the federation of Jewish labor in the Yishuv, launched a campaign to physically remove Arab workers employed in Zionist industry in cities. During the same period, Jewish society was mobilized to picket Jewish-owned citrus groves that employed Arab labor. It was after that time, too, that Ben-Gurion began using—albeit with a modified meaning—the term Vladimir Jabotinsky had coined in articles in the early 1920s: "the iron wall." Thus, in 1929, Ben-Gurion wrote of the need for an "iron wall of [Zionist] workers' settlements surrounding every Hebrew city and town, land and human bridges that would link isolated

points,"<sup>61</sup> and which would be capable of enforcing the doctrine of exclusive "Hebrew Labor" and "Hebrew Land."

Recalling the implementation of the doctrine of Hebrew Labor some years later, Mapai leader David Hacoheh explained:

I remember being one of the first of our comrades [of the Ahdut Ha'avodah] to go to London after the First World War.... There I became a socialist....[In Palestine] I had to fight my friends on the issue of Jewish socialism, to defend the fact that I would not accept Arabs in my trade union, the Histadrut; to defend preaching to housewives that they not buy at Arab stores; to prevent Arab workers from getting jobs there....To pour kerosene on Arab tomatoes; to attack Jewish housewives in the markets and smash the Arab eggs they had bought; to praise to the skies the Kereen Kayemet [Jewish National Fund] that sent Hankin to Beirut to buy land from absentee effendi [landlords] and to throw the fellahin [peasants] off the land—to buy dozens of dunams—from an Arab is permitted, but to sell, God forbid, one Jewish dunam to an Arab is prohibited.<sup>62</sup>

The fostering of Arab-Jewish separation was not merely an ideological decision. It advanced in pragmatic terms Zionist goals of colonization and could be said to lay the groundwork for the transfer solution. Yishuv leaders such as Ben-Gurion,<sup>63</sup> Berl Katznelson, Yosef Baratz, David Hacoheh, and many others, including moderates and committed socialists, saw the logical connection between the doctrine of separation between Jews and Arabs—for them the consolidation and concretization of the development of a Jewish national life—and an eventual transfer. Indeed, during the debates that took place in the of summer 1937, a number of Zionists cited as precedents legitimizing mass transfer the forcible "mini-transfers" of Arab tenant farmers from the lands bought out from under them from absentee landlords. It is also no coincidence that the emphasis on exclusionist concepts correlated with the active (though private) promotion of the transfer schemes from 1936 onwards.

Meanwhile, the Zionist leadership, headed by Ben-Gurion's Mapai party (created in 1930 through the merger of *Hapo'el Hatza'ir* and *Ahdut Ha'avodah*), took advantage of the Palestinian rebellion of 1936-39 to strengthen and expand the Yishuv's military forces, the Haganah. The build-up of the Yishuv's military apparatus and infrastructure was also conjoined with an apparently growing conviction that a fundamental Zionist solution to the "Arab demographic problem" was to be found not in agreement with the indigenous population, nor even, perhaps, with outside Arab leaders but, ultimately, in a military solution. The belief was beginning to take hold that the "Arab problem" could be tackled only from a position of military strength and by creating economic, military, and settlement *faits accomplis* in Arab Palestine. In 1936, Ben-Gurion declared at a meeting of the Mapai Central Committee:

...there is no chance of an understanding with the Arabs unless we first reach an understanding with the English, by which we will become a preponderant force in Palestine. What can drive the Arabs to a mutual understanding with us?... Facts...only after we manage to establish a great Jewish fact in this country...only then will the precondition for discussion with the Arabs be met.<sup>64</sup>

Also significant is the fact that as early as the summer of 1937, the Haganah had prepared a military plan [the Avner Plan] for the conquest of Palestine in three stages, with the exception of the Negev, south of Beersheba.<sup>65</sup>

But while the Zionists were concentrating on building up the Yishuv's organization and military strength, they continued to be attentive to how their actions were perceived among their Western sponsors. Weizmann, for instance, who presided over Zionist activities in the West, maintained in 1931 that the Zionists' public insistence on creating a majority in Palestine could be interpreted by the world "as an attempt to expel the Arabs from Palestine"<sup>66</sup>—this at the very time when he was actively promoting his plan of transferring the Arabs to neighboring states.\* Similar concern for

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\*See pp. 30-44.

public perceptions impelled the Zionists in 1931 temporarily to endorse the formula of a legislative council (or assembly) based on "parity" between Arabs and Jews (at a time when the Jews constituted only 17 percent of the population). The "parity" idea was meant to deflect British pressures for establishing representative government, viewed with great anxiety given the overwhelming Arab majority.<sup>67</sup> But by the mid-1930s, when British pressure for self-government had diminished and when the Yishuv was growing in numerical strength and confidence, the parity slogan was dropped and even denounced by Ben-Gurion as incongruous with Zionist aims in Palestine.<sup>68</sup> Similarly, Ben Gurion's slogan from the 1920s, "not to rule and not to be ruled in Eretz Yisrael," was shown in the 1930s to be little more than a temporizing, public relations gesture, belied by his private pronouncements in support of Zionist maximalist aims.

Although the Yishuv's politics were far from monolithic, the basic assumptions concerning the solution to the "Arab problem" in Palestine were by and large shared, the main differences being tactical, rhetorical, and stylistic. It is true that some marginal groups such as Brit Shalom (Covenant of Peace), which ceased in the early 1930s, and later Ihud (Union), organized in 1942, took a different line. These binationalist groups espoused a *modus vivendi* of a binational framework accommodating Palestinian nationalism, and favored a binational state with political and civil equality for Jews and Arabs. But despite the immense international stature and prestige of some of binationalism's adherents—notably Judah Magnes, Martin Buber, and Hans Kohn—the groups had virtually no influence either on policy or on the Yishuv at large. Moreover, a number of the liberal intellectuals adhering to binationalist groups actually accepted the Zionist objective of a Jewish majority in the long run; some of the leading members of Brit Shalom, including, for example, David Werner Senator, one of the four non-Zionist members of the Jewish Agency Executive, and Ya'acov Thon, Arthur Ruppin's assistant and later successor as di-

rector of the Palestine Land Development Company, both ended up advocating "maximum" transfer, as we shall see.<sup>69</sup> Arthur Ruppin himself, a cofounder of Brit Shalom, was an early proponent of transfer, as already noted.

The binational groups notwithstanding, the main division within Zionism was between the Labor and Revisionist movements. Revisionism, which advocated the "revision" of the Mandate to include Transjordan as well as Palestine, was established by Vladimir Jabotinsky in 1925. The movement has always been known for its maximalist, uncompromising positions, in contrast to the pragmatic, gradualist, and flexible approach of the dominant Labor Zionism. With regard to ultimate solutions relating to the "Arab problem," however, there was little difference between them.

Jabotinsky frequently accused Labor Zionism of hypocrisy; in his view, the creation of a Jewish state had always meant imposing the will of Zionism on the Palestinian Arabs, and the resistance of the latter to the former was but the natural and logical consequence of Zionist objectives. According to Jabotinsky, Zionist actions had been carried out against the wishes of the Arab majority.

Zionist colonization, even the most restricted, must either be terminated or carried out in defiance of the will of the native population. This colonization can, therefore, continue and develop only under the protection of a force independent of the local population—an iron wall which the native population cannot break through. This is, in toto, our policy towards the Arabs. To formulate it in any other way would be hypocrisy.

He also pointed out that Zionists believed in an "iron wall":

In this sense, there is no meaningful difference between our "militarists" and our "vegetarians." One prefers an iron wall of Jewish bayonets, the other proposes an iron wall of British bayonets, the third proposes an agreement with Baghdad, and appears to be satisfied with Baghdad's bayonets—a strange and somewhat risky taste—but we all applaud, day and night, the iron wall.<sup>70</sup>



The doctrine of the "iron wall of bayonets" was to form a central plank in the Revisionists' attitude towards the Palestinian Arabs. In Jabotinsky's mind, to conclude an agreement with the Palestinians allowing the creation of a predominant Jewish majority and eventual statehood—which the Labor groups publicly advocated in the 1920s and early 1930s—was neither possible nor desirable. On the contrary, a confrontation was natural and even inevitable, Jabotinsky pronounced. Only an "iron wall," of a Jewish armed garrison, would be able to secure Jewish sovereignty on both sides of the Jordan River.<sup>71</sup>

Jabotinsky was, inevitably, a proponent of transfer. In a letter to one of his Revisionist colleagues in the United States dated November 1939, he wrote: "There is no choice: the Arabs must make room for the Jews in Eretz Israel. If it was possible to transfer the Baltic peoples, it is also possible to move the Palestinian Arabs," adding that Iraq and Saudi Arabia could absorb them.<sup>72</sup> Jabotinsky also alluded in a number of articles to the Greco-Turkish "transfer," describing it as a brutal, coercive action imposed by the victorious Turks but which proved ultimately beneficial to the Greeks.<sup>73</sup>

Like Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, Katznelson, and Tabenkin, Jabotinsky expressed contempt towards the indigenous Arabs. Yet, unlike the Labor figures, he did not mince his words: "We Jews, thank God, have nothing to do with the East....The Islamic soul must be broomed out of Eretz-Yisrael."<sup>74</sup> Echoing Zangwill, Jabotinsky described Arabs and Muslims as "yelling rabble dressed up in gaudy, savage rags."<sup>75</sup>

The ideological legacy of Jabotinsky-led Revisionism found expression in two offshoots. The first was the Irgun Tzvai Leumi (IZL, or the Irgun), an underground military organization formed in 1935 and commanded in the 1940s by Menahem Begin, later prime minister of Israel. The second was the Lehi (Lohamei Herut Yisra'el, also known as the Stern Gang after its founder, Avraham Stern), which broke

away from the IZL in June 1940; the organization was later co-commanded by Yitzhak Shamir. Stern described the Arabs as "beasts of the desert, not a legitimate people."<sup>76</sup> "The Arabs are not a nation but a mole that grew in the wilderness of the eternal desert. They are nothing but murderers," wrote Stern in 1940.<sup>77</sup> Lehi advocated that any Palestinian resistance to Zionist objectives should be crushed mercilessly. Moreover, Lehi's original doctrine, formulated by Stern, called not only for the "transfer" of the Palestinians but also of the Transjordanians, Syrians, and Lebanese who resided in those areas deemed to belong to the Land of Israel.<sup>78</sup> In its memorandum to the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) in 1947 as well as in its political program of July-August 1948 in preparation for the first Knesset election,<sup>79</sup> Lehi called for the compulsory evacuation of the entire Arab population of Palestine, preferably to Iraq, and declared it "considers an exchange of the Arab population and the Jews of Arab countries as the best solution for the troubled relationship between the Jewish people and the Arabs."<sup>80</sup>

Jabotinsky endorsed the terror campaign launched in the late 1930s by the Irgun, a campaign that involved such actions as placing bomb-loaded vegetable barrows in crowded Arab markets in Haifa and Jerusalem and firing indiscriminately on Arab civilian houses.<sup>81</sup> While Irgun's bombing attacks of the late 1930s and 1948 were aimed at Palestinian civilians, the group also launched attacks against the British from 1944 to 1948. Lehi specialized in political assassinations. Later, during the 1947-48 war, these campaigns were intensified and played an important role in the exodus of Palestinians from what became the State of Israel.

### The Weizmann Transfer Scheme of 1930

In August 1929, Arab-Jewish clashes erupted throughout Palestine following a political demonstration by militant

Revisionist Jews at the Wailing Wall, next to the Haram al-Sharif, Islam's third holiest site. The Shaw Commission appointed by the British government to investigate the causes of the disturbances—in which 133 Jews, including women and children, were killed—submitted its findings in March 1930. According to the report, the "Arabs have come to see in Jewish immigration not only a menace to their livelihood, but a possible overlord of the future." It further signalled the seriousness of landlessness among Palestinian peasants, and warned that further Zionist colonization would exacerbate an already grave problem.<sup>82</sup>

Indeed, one of the chief causes of this landlessness was the sale of tracts of land by absentee landlords to the Yishuv and the subsequent eviction of the tenant farmers. Peasant tenancy had evolved into a permanent institution in Arab villages, and was not different from outright ownership except in the payment of ground rent by the tenants.<sup>83</sup> Almost invariably, the tenants had cultivated the land for generations, and many had once owned the land they farmed but had been forced at some point to sell to creditors or absentee landlords. The fact that the tenant farmers, more or less oblivious to the legal status of the land, regarded the land as their own property only increased their bitterness when they were forced to vacate it.

It was against the background of the 1929 disturbances that Chaim Weizmann, president of both the Zionist Organization and the newly established Jewish Agency Executive, actively began promoting ideas for Arab transfer in private discussions with British officials and ministers. Weizmann had met with the Shaw Commission in the course of its investigations in January, before the Commission's report was drawn up. Already at that time, it was clear that land and landownership were important issues in the inquiry, and Weizmann had argued before the Commission that there would have been no land problems if Transjordan—considered by Zionists as part of the greater land of Israel—had not been separated from Palestine.<sup>84</sup>

Several months later, on 4 March 1930—the eve of the publication of the Shaw Commission report—Weizmann and other Zionist leaders met with the parliamentary under-secretary for the colonies, Dr. Drummond Shiels. Shiels had supported the Zionists in their opposition to the establishment of democratic self-government in Palestine, a proposition that would have placed the Jews, still a small minority, at great disadvantage. During his meeting with Weizmann, Shiels expressed the view that “a transfer of the Arab population was desirable.”<sup>85</sup> According to Weizmann’s account of the meeting:

Some radical solution must be found, and [Dr. Shiels] didn’t see why one should not really make Palestine a national home for the Jews and tell it frankly to the Arabs, pointing out that in Transjordan and Mesopotamia they had vast territories where they could work without let or hindrance.... Weizmann replied that a solution like that was a courageous and statesman-like attempt to grapple with a problem that had been tackled hitherto half-heartedly; that if the Jews were allowed to develop their National Home in Palestine unhindered the Arabs would certainly not suffer—as they hadn’t hitherto. Some might flow off into neighbouring countries, and this quasi exchange of population could be fostered and encouraged. It had been done with signal success under the aegis of the League of Nations in the case of the Greeks and Turks...<sup>86</sup>

Two days later, on 6 March, Weizmann elaborated on the idea of transferring the Palestinian population to Transjordan and Iraq during a meeting with Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb), the colonial secretary. Lord Passfield mentioned that, from what he had heard of the as-yet unpublished Shaw report, “the only grave question it had revealed was the problem of [Arab] tenants on land which had been acquired by Zionist[s],” and that “the cumulative effect of this process, if it continued, might produce a landless proletariat, which would be a cause of unrest in the country.”<sup>87</sup> According to Weizmann’s account of the meeting, Lord Passfield said that “one had to stabilise the conditions in the country,”

and that "Transjordan might be a way out."<sup>88</sup> Weizmann concurred, repeating his contention that land problems could be traced to Transjordan's removal from the Mandate and the exclusion of Jewish colonization there. Therefore he added, "Now that one found oneself in difficulties in Palestine, surely if we could not cross the Jordan the Arabs could. And this was applicable to Iraq."<sup>89</sup>

While Lord Passfield was searching for ways to stabilize the "politically dangerous" situation that had been caused by the dispossession of the Palestinian farmers, Weizmann was putting forward specific, clearly formulated proposals in the direction of encouraging an Arab exodus. At one point in the conversation, Passfield remarked that Iraq, with an independent government, might object to the proposal. According to Weizmann's account:

My reply was: "Of course, it isn't easy, but these countries have to be developed, and they cannot be developed capitalistically because of their political situation, but they could be colonised by Moslems, and possibly by Jews. One requires a great deal of preparation for it, and, in cooperation with the government we could attempt to negotiate with the Arabs"....I then said, "supposing we were to create a Development Company which would acquire a million dunams of land in Transjordan, this would establish a reserve [for Arab resettlement] and relieve Palestine from pressure, if any should exist."<sup>90</sup>

Over the next few months, the transfer proposal was on Weizmann's mind, as evidenced from the correspondence between him and several colleagues in May.<sup>91</sup> On 23 June, he sent a telegram to Felix Green asking for a detailed account of the land available in Transjordan for the resettlement of proposed Palestinian transferees.<sup>92</sup>

What is significant is that for the first time the Yishuv leadership had presented members of the British government with an official, albeit secret, proposal for the transfer of Palestinians to Transjordan. Weizmann left the details of the plan to be worked out by Pinhas Rutenberg, an engineer, industrialist, and financier who was both chairman of

Va'ad Leumi, the Yishuv's National Council, and a member of the Jewish Agency Executive (though he resigned both positions in 1931). Rutenberg had already worked out detailed plans for exploiting the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers for hydroelectric purposes for the Yishuv, and in 1921 the Mandate government had granted him a concession on the basis of which he founded the Palestine Electric Corporation in 1923.

The Weizmann-Rutenberg scheme of 1930, which was presented to the Colonial Office, proposed that a loan of one million Palestinian pounds be raised from Jewish financial sources for the resettlement of Palestinian peasant communities in Transjordan, pending the granting of permission for Zionist settlement east of the Jordan River.<sup>93</sup>

It is difficult to determine the details of the Weizmann-Rutenberg plan with any certainty while the Colonial Office files on the subject remain classified. What is clear is that the plan was swiftly rejected by Lord Passfield, who had become in the meantime sharply aware of the extent of Palestinian nationalist opposition to Zionism,<sup>94</sup> and by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's government. In June Lord Passfield wrote a letter to the prime minister saying that "neither the British nor the Palestine Government could possibly touch this Transjordan project."<sup>95</sup> At two meetings, with Weizmann on 7 July 1930 and with Weizmann and Selig Brodetsky, the president of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland and a member of the Zionist Executive, on 18 July, the colonial secretary ruled out any large-scale Palestinian displacement and resettlement in Transjordan as well as any Jewish settlement there. Two reasons were given: prohibitive financial cost, and the anticipated strength of the Arab opposition.<sup>96</sup> The British treasury added its objection to any financial commitment to the plan.<sup>97</sup>

Indeed, far from going along with Weizmann's proposals in favor of transfer, Lord Passfield was responsible for the issuance in October 1930 of the Passfield White Paper,

which recommended that restrictions be placed on Jewish immigration in order to alleviate the pressures on Palestinian peasants resulting from Zionist acquisition of the land they worked.<sup>98</sup> The White Paper's conclusions were influenced by the Hope-Simpson report, likewise issued in October 1930, although completed several months earlier, which estimated that about 30,000 rural Palestinian families (i.e., 29.4 percent of the rural population) had become landless and which stated that no additional land was available in Palestine for settlement by Jewish immigrants.

The Zionists were extremely unhappy about what was seen as the pro-Arab tilt of the new statement of British policy, but Weizmann, while protesting that the White Paper "was inconsistent with the terms of the Mandate,"<sup>99</sup> used the occasion to reiterate his solution of transfer. In an article published in the London-based *Week End Review* on 1 November 1930, he wrote:

No statesmanlike view...could ignore the fact that Transjordan is legally part of Palestine...that in race, language and culture its people are indistinguishable from the Arabs of Western Palestine; that it is separated from Western Palestine only by a narrow stream; that it has been established as an Arab reserve, and that it would be just as easy for landless Arabs or cultivators from the congested areas to migrate to Transjordan as to migrate from one part of Western Palestine to another.<sup>100</sup>

Despite the setback (temporary, as it turned out) represented by the Passfield White Paper, Weizmann persisted in his efforts to persuade British officials that the transfer of dispossessed Palestinian farmers to Transjordan was a sound idea, and that any problems associated with it were mainly of an economic order. Alluding to the objections based on the cost of the project, he repeated his earlier suggestion to Lord Passfield that a loan could be raised. The loan, however, would have to be guaranteed by the British, who would also have to agree to extending the Yishuv to Transjordan, which would constitute a reserve for

Arab transferees.<sup>101</sup> In a private discussion with Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson on 4 December 1930, Weizmann proposed that a Round Table Conference be convened with the Arabs in order to discuss the "problem of the congested area in Cis-Jordan [which] could be solved by development of, and migration of Arabs to, Transjordania."<sup>102</sup>

Weizmann's efforts to promote transfer were very much behind the scenes, but others were aware of his activities. Lewis Namier, the political secretary of the powerful Jewish Agency, had been present at the 4 December meeting in the House of Commons.<sup>103</sup> A hint that Ben-Gurion had been privy to the scheme is found in his diary entry of 24 June 1930, the day after Weizmann's wire to Felix Green asking for details about land availability in Transjordan. Ben-Gurion, who at the same time was conducting talks with British officials in London, wrote that the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine did not mean "the removal of many Arabs from Palestine"—a possible reference to the Weizmann-Rutenberg plan.<sup>104</sup>

Nor was Weizmann alone in advancing transfer solutions during that period: on 17 June 1930, the proposal of transferring Arabs from Palestine to Transjordan to solve the problem of dispossessed peasants was put forward at a meeting of the Directorate of the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the leading settlement organization.<sup>105</sup> The Directorate repeated the proposal the following year, during its meeting of 29 April 1931. Also in 1931, the Jewish Agency submitted a proposal to a British-appointed committee headed by Lewis French to study the situation of dispossessed Arab farmers, including those of Wadi al-Hawarith evicted from lands sold to the JNF by an absentee landlord. The solution proposed by the Jewish Agency—removal of the dispossessed Arabs to Transjordan—was rejected by the British High Commissioner, Arthur Wauchope, as an attempt to expel the country's peasant population.<sup>106</sup> The following year, Victor Jacobson, then representative of the Zionist



Organization at the League of Nations and head of the Zionist political office in Paris, suggested in a secret memorandum the partition of Palestine on condition that 120,000 Arabs be removed from the Jewish area.<sup>107</sup>

While Weizmann's discussion of transfer plans were conducted behind closed doors, others were not so discreet. Menahem Ussishkin, one of the leading figures of the Yishuv, long the chairman of the Jewish National Fund and a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, publicly called for the transfer of the Palestinians to other parts of the Middle East. In an address to journalists in Jerusalem on 28 April 1930, he stated:

We must continually raise the demand that our land be returned to our possession....If there are other inhabitants there, they must be transferred to some other place. We must take over the land. We have a greater and nobler ideal than preserving several hundred thousands of Arab fellahin.<sup>108</sup>

Just as Zangwill's public utterances, a decade earlier, that the Arabs are not "entitled to the rules of democracy" and should be "gradually transplanted" had compromised Weizmann's dealings with Emir Faisal, so Ussishkin's public statements were considered politically damaging to the Zionist cause. Two days later, on 30 April, the Jewish Agency Executive passed a motion criticizing Ussishkin's statement,<sup>109</sup> even though the Agency itself would propose a study involving transfer the following year, and Ussishkin's own Jewish National Fund would submit a proposal recommending transfer to the Lewis French committee. The objection was to the *public* mention of transfer, which in the leadership's view could only produce such undesirable consequences as increasing Palestinian unrest, intensifying pressures to halt Jewish immigration to Palestine, and alienating public opinion in the West.

While Weizmann's 1930 transfer proposals were rejected by the British government, the justifications used in their defense formed the cornerstone of subsequent argu-

mentation for transfer. Yishuv leaders continued to assert that there was nothing "immoral" about the concept; that the transfer of the Greek and Turkish populations provided a precedent for a similar measure for the Palestinian Arabs; and that the uprooting and transfer of the population to Transjordan, Iraq, or any other part of the Arab world would merely constitute a relocation from one Arab district to another.<sup>110</sup>

## Notes

1. A speech delivered at a meeting of the French Zionist Federation, Paris, 28 March 1914; cited in Barnet Litvinoff, ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, vol. 1, series B, paper 24 (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1983), pp. 115-16.
2. See protocol of Ruppin's speech at the Jewish Agency Executive's meeting, 20 May 1936, in Yosef Heller, *Bama'uak Lemedinah, Hamediniyut Hatzionit Bashanim 1936-1948* [The Struggle for the State: The Zionist Policy 1936-1948] (Jerusalem: 1984), p. 140.
3. Israel Zangwill, *The Voice of Jerusalem* (London: William Heinemann, 1920), p. 104.
4. In 1906, "in all of Palestine there were 700,000 inhabitants, only 55,000 of whom were Jews, and only 550 of these were pioneers" [i.e., Zionists]. Shabtai Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 9-10. In contrast with these Zionist "pioneers" the Palestinian Jews were mainly orthodox Jews, who lived in Jerusalem and a few smaller towns, and who were strongly opposed to the goals of political Zionism.
5. Speech delivered in April 1905, in Israel Zangwill, *Speeches, Articles and Letters* (London: The Soncino Press, 1937), p. 210.
6. A reference to a well-known essay, Yitzhaq Epstein, "The Hidden Question," *Hashiloah* (1907), pp. 193-206.
7. See Neil Caplan, *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917-1925* (London: Frank Cass, 1978) and Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians* (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
8. Yosef Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 50 and 62.
9. Ahad Ha'Am, "Emet Meeretz-Yisrael" [The Truth from the Land of Israel], in *Complete Works* (Hebrew), (Jerusalem: 1961), pp. 27-29.
10. *Ibid.* Ahad Ha'Am is also quoted in Hans Kohn, *Zionism Reconsidered*, Michael Selzer, ed. (London: 1970), p. 195.

11. Epstein, "Hidden Question," pp. 193-206.
12. Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, pp. 49-50.
13. "Society of Jews" was the name used by Herzl in his book *Judenstat* to designate the political organization that he envisaged as the future representative of the Zionist movement.
14. Raphael Patai, ed., *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, vol. I Harry Zohn, trans., (New York: Herzl Press and T. Yoseloff, 1960), pp. 88-89. The Herzl Press is a publishing house of the Jewish Agency for the Israeli-American Section.
15. M. Smilansky, "In the Steppe," *Works, Vol. I, 1891-1893* (Tel Aviv: undated), p. 206, quoted in Ahmad El Kodsy and Eli Lobel, *The Arab World and Israel* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 120.
16. Zangwill, *Speeches*, p. 210.
17. According to Jabotinsky's recollections of a conversation with Zangwill in 1916, in *Hamashkif*, 31 July 1939; and in Jabotinsky, *Zichronot Ben Dori*, pp. 254-63. See also "Discussions with Zangwill," *Der Moment*, 27 July 1939, quoted in Yaacov Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement 1925-1948* (London: Frank Cass, 1988), pp. 264, 400.
18. Cited in Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, p.271; Yosef Nedava, "Tochniyot Helufei Ochlosin Lepetron Be'ayat Eretz-Yisrael" [Population Exchange Plans for the Solution of the Problem of the Land of Israel], *Gesher* (Jerusalem) 24, nos. 1-2 (Spring-Summer 1978), p. 153; Yosef Nedava, "Yisrael Zangwill Vehabe'ayah Ha'arvit" [Israel Zangwill and the Arab Problem], *Haumah* (Jerusalem) no. 14 (October 1965), pp. 209-16.
19. The Ruppin memorandum is quoted in Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (London: 1972), p. 231. Also in 1911, Joshua H. Buchmil, a Russian Zionist propagandist, put forward a proposal to transfer the Palestine Arabs to northern Syria and Iraq to the Palestine Committee of the Tenth Zionist Congress held in Basle. Chaim Simons, *International Proposals to Transfer Arabs from Palestine 1895-1947* (New Jersey: Ktav Publishing House, 1988), pp. 31-32.
20. Susan Hattis, "Old Idea with A Hateful Twist," *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, 2 August 1985; Paul Alsberg, "The Arab Question in the Policy of the Zionist Executive before the First World War" (Hebrew), *Shiurat Tzion* (Jerusalem) 4 (1955-

- 56), pp. 206-7. Laqueur, *A History of Zionism*, p. 231, mentions that Nahum Sokolow, subsequently president of the World Zionist Organization, had, also in 1914, endorsed the notion of Arab transfer. Another Zionist publicist, Avraham Sharon (Schwadron), began to propagate his views on compulsory Arab transfer as early as 1916. Simons, *International Proposals to Transfer Arabs from Palestine 1895-1947*, pp. 56-60.
21. Ruppin Diary, Ruppin's letter to Hans Kohn, 30 May 1930, quoted in Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, pp. 172-73 and 189.
  22. B. Katznelson and Y. Kaufman, eds., *Ketvei Nahman Syrkin* [Writings of Nahman Syrkin], Vol. I (Tel Aviv: 1939), pp. 20, 53-54; Mordechai Nisan, *Hamedinah Hayehudit Vehabe'ayah Ha'aruit* [The Jewish State and the Arab Problem] (Tel Aviv: Hadar, 1986) p. 109.
  23. Cited in Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, pp. 259 and 278. Motzkin repeated his transfer proposal in late 1918 in a paper entitled "The Basis of Zionism and the Way to Build Up Palestine." Simons, *International Proposals to Transfer Arabs from Palestine 1895-1947*, pp. 33-34.
  24. Litvinoff, ed., *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, vol. I, series B, pp. 256-57. Weizmann pronounced the same formula in an address to the English Zionist Federation in 1919: "By a Jewish National Home I mean the creation of such conditions that as the country is developed we can pour in a considerable number of immigrants, and finally establish such a society in Palestine that Palestine shall be as Jewish as England is English, or America American." (Address delivered in London on 21 September 1919). See also *Jewish Chronicle*, 20 May 1921, in Arie Bober, ed., *The Other Israel* (New York: Garden City, Doubleday, 1972), p. 137.
  25. *Arab Bulletin*, no. 64, 7 October 1917, pp. 389-91, in PRO, FO. 882/26.
  26. Quoted in Nedava, "Tochniyot Helufei Ochlosin," p. 155.
  27. Cited in Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, pp. 57-58; *Jewish Chronicle*, 13 December 1918.
  28. Zangwill, *The Voice of Jerusalem*, p. 103.
  29. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
  30. *Jewish Chronicle*, 12 December 1919.

31. Nedava, "Tochniyot Helufei Ochlosin," p. 153, citing a letter from Max Nordau to Zangwill dated 15 January 1919, in Zangwill's file, CZA Jerusalem.
32. In 1917 the Jews constituted 10 percent of the population. They rose to 17 percent in 1931 and 33 percent in 1940. Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), p. 34.
33. PRO, CAB, 24/24.
34. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill, Vol. 4, 1916-1922* (London: William Heinemann, 1975), p. 484.
35. *Jewish Chronicle*, 3 January 1964, p. 7.
36. *Ibid.*, 14 January 1964, p. 7.
37. *Ibid.*
38. See Yosef Nedava, "British Plans for the Resettlement of Palestinian Arabs" (Hebrew), *Haumah*, no. 89 (Winter 1987/88), p. 132.
39. Nedava, "Tochniyot Helufei Ochlosin," p. 164, citing a letter dated 18 November 1917 from Zangwill to an aide in the Territorial Movement.
40. Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, p. 114.
41. Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, p. 56.
42. *Ibid.*, citing a letter dated 19 August 1918. For more details on Weizmann's attitude towards the Palestinian Arabs, see his letter to Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary and author of the famous Balfour Declaration, dated 30 May 1918, in Doreen Ingrams' *Palestine Papers, 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict* (London: John Murray, 1972), pp. 31-32.
43. See Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, pp. 118-19.
44. Ben-Gurion's views were voiced at the joint secretariat of Ahdut Ha'avodah and Hapo'el Hatza'ir, 10 November 1929; quoted in G. Shefer, "General Solution vs. Moderation in the Israel-Arab Conflict," *Zionism and the Arab Question* (Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Center, 1979).
45. Protocols of the Mapai party, 29 September 1936, quoted in Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, pp. 165 and 214.
46. Letter to Shertok dated 24 July 1937, in *ibid.*, pp. 167-68.
47. Yitzhak Tabenkin, *Devarim* [Speeches], Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: 1972), p. 264.

48. Berl Katznelson, "Self-restraint and Defense," a speech dated 28 August 1936, in *Keta'vim* [Writings], Vol. 8 (Tel Aviv: 1948), pp. 209-26.
49. A speech at the Mapai Council, Haifa, 23 January 1937, cited in Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, p. 253.
50. Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, p. 131, quoting Ben-Gurion's speech to the Inner Action Committee in Jerusalem, 12 October 1936. In a speech to the British Empire Labor Conference in London in August 1930, Ben-Gurion spoke against the British Labor government's recognition of the demand for self-determination—in the shape of home rule—in India. He feared this would create pressure for equal recognition of the Palestinian Arabs' rights for self-determination. For an abridgement of Ben-Gurion's speech see his *Yoman* [Diary], 4 August 1930, and *Igrot* [Letters], Vol. 3 (Tel Aviv: 'Am 'Oved, 1974), letter dated 28 July 1930, cited in Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, pp. 109 and 211.
51. Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, p. 214, quoting Beilinson's article "Right over Palestine," in *Davar*, 4 December 1929.
52. *Ibid.*
53. Quoted in Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, p. 39.
54. Yosef Schechtman, *The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story, Vol. 2, 1923-35* (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Karni Publishing House, 1959), p. 152.
55. Nedava, "Tochniyot Helufei Ochlosin," pp. 164-65, quoting Levi's manuscript. Levi was mentioned in Edward Norman's transfer scheme to Iraq in 1934 as a useful agent who would be willing to assist in the scheme. See p. 141.
56. Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, pp. 137-40.
57. The Israeli historian Yehoshua Porath writes in his book *In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945* (London: Frank Cass, 1986, pp. 62-67) about the support of some highly important Zionist leaders for a Jewish state in Palestine linked to an Arab federation in the Fertile Crescent and/or Arabia. What is crucially missing in his otherwise fully-documented work, however, is the fact that the support for Arab federation was linked in Zionist thinking with the transfer idea, as in Ben-Gurion's proposal to Musa al-Alami.
58. Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine is My Country: The Story of Musa Alami* (London: John Murry, 1969), p.105.

59. Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, p.140; David Ben-Gurion, *Pegishotai Im Manhigim 'Araulyim* [My Meetings with Arab Leaders] (Tel Aviv: 'Am 'Oved, 1967), p. 25.
60. David Ben-Gurion, *Zichronot* [Memoirs], Vol. 3 (Tel Aviv: 'Am 'Oved, 1971-72), p. 163.
61. Quoted in Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, p. 79.
62. Published in *Ha'aretz*, 15 November 1969, and quoted in Arie Bober, *The Other Israel: The Radical Case against Zionism* (New York: Garden City, 1972), p. 12.
63. The notion that the transfer was in conjunction with the doctrine of "Hebrew Labor" was stated explicitly by Ben-Gurion in 1937. See his *Yoman* [Diary], 12 July 1937; Ben-Gurion, *Zichronot* [Memoirs], Vol. 4, p. 298. See also the Soskin plan, p. 80.
64. Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, p. 155.
65. *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah* [The History of the Haganah], Vol. 2, part 2, pp. 748-58.
66. Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, p. 205.
67. The Zionists threw their weight vociferously against the idea of self-governing institutions—a demand put forward by the Palestinians and toyed with by the British in the 1920s. See Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (New York: Harper, 1949), pp. 207 and 381; J.M. Machover, *Governing Palestine: The Case against a Parliament* (London: P.S. King, 1936), p. 21. For further details on the tactical nature of "parity," see Aharon Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World* (London: 1970), p. 255; Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, pp. 63 and 77.
68. See S.L. Hattis, *The Bi-national Idea in Palestine during Mandatory Times* (Haifa: 1970), p. 167. In 1968 Meir Ya'ari, the co-leader of Mapam, "taunted" Ben-Gurion with having advocated a binational state in the aftermath of the 1967 war. In response Ben-Gurion wrote in *Ha'aretz* on 15 March 1968 that neither his own writings, nor those of his Mapai's colleagues "contained a single idea that could be described in favour of bi-nationalism."
69. The Palestine Land Development Company was called upon, among other things, to purchase land on behalf of the Jewish National Fund. Before 1948 its board included prominent leaders advocating transfer, such as Victor Jacobson, Eliezer Kaplan, Berl Katznelson, David Werner Senator, Menahem Ussishkin, and Chaim Weizmann. Thon,



who succeeded Ruppin as managing director of the Company, was appointed towards the end of 1937 as the head of the Jewish Agency's first Transfer Committee.

70. Quoted in Lenni Brenner, *The Iron Wall—Zionist Revisionism from Jabotinsky to Shamir* (London: Zed Books, 1984), pp. 74-75.
71. For further discussion of Jabotinsky's strategy, see Joseph Schechtman, *The Jabotinsky Story: Fighter and Prophet* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956), p. 324. In 1925 Jabotinsky wrote an essay entitled "The Iron Law": "If you wish to colonize a land in which people are already living, you must provide a garrison for the land, or find a benefactor who will maintain the garrison on your behalf...Zionism is a colonizing adventure and, therefore, it stands or falls on the question of armed forces." See *The Shahak Papers*, no. 31, "Collection on Jabotinsky: His Life and Excerpts from his Writings," p. 16.
72. Cited in Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, "Expelling Palestinians," *The Washington Post*, Outlook section, 7 February 1988. Jabotinsky's letter was written against the background of the German-Soviet pact of August 1939.
73. Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement 1925-1948*, p. 264.
74. Cited in Ya'acov Shavit, "The Attitude of Zionist Revisionism towards the Arabs," in *Zionism and the Arab Question* (Hebrew), p. 74.
75. See Joseph Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman: The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story, The Early Years* (New York: T. Yoseloff, 1956), p. 54.
76. Cited in Amos Perlmutter, *The Life and Times of Menachem Begin* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1987), p. 212.
77. Cited in Yosef Heller, "Between Messianism and Realpolitik—Lehi and the Arab Question, 1940-1947," in Israel Gutman, ed., *Yahdut Zemanenu* [Contemporary Jewry], A Research Annual, Vol. 1, 1984, p. 225.
78. See Israel Shahak, "A History of the Concept of Transfer in Zionism," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 3 (Spring 1989), p. 36.
79. Lohamei Herut Yisrael (Lehi), *Ketauim* [Writings], Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: 1960), p. 581; *Ketauim*, Vol. 1 (Tel Aviv; 1959), pp. 27-28; and Heller, "Between Messianism and Realpolitik—Lehi and the Arab Question, 1940-1947," pp. 204-207 and 237-39.

80. Quoted in Shavit, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement 1925-1948*, p. 267.
81. See Samuel Katz, *Days of Fire* (London: W.H. Allen, 1968), pp. 31-37.
82. Shaw Commission Report Cmd. 3530, 1930. Apparently the Shaw report had considerable impact on British public opinion, which until then was predominantly in favor of Zionism.
83. D. Warriner, "Land Tenure Problems in the Fertile Crescent," in C. Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East: 1880-1914* (Chicago: 1966), p. 75.
84. Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, p. 69, citing minutes of the 43rd meeting of the Zionist Executive, London, 22 January 1930.
85. *Ibid.*, citing Weizmann's notes on the meeting held in a private room in the House of Commons.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 69; *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Vol. XIV.
87. *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Vol. I, Series B, paper 116, p. 591.
88. *Ibid.*
89. *Ibid.*
90. *Ibid.*, p. 592.
91. See Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, p. 93, note 65.
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid.*, citing Weizmann's notes: Weizmann to Green, 15 May 1930, Weizmann to Melchett, 26 May 1930.
94. The Weizmann transfer proposal could not have come as a complete surprise to Lord Passfield. On 2 September 1929, his wife Beatrice, who had published in close co-authorship with him for many years, wrote—against the background of violent unrest in Palestine and the subsequent pressure put on her husband by Zionists—"Is there any principle relating to the rights of peoples to the territory in which they happen to live? I admire Jews and dislike Arabs. But the Zionist movement seems to me to be a gross violation of the right of the native to remain where he was born—if there is such a right." Beatrice Webb, *Diaries*, Margaret Cole, ed. (London: 1956), p. 217-18.

95. Letter to P.M. dated 23 July 1930, cited in Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, pp. 69 and 93.
96. Joseph Gorny, *The British Labour Movement and Zionism 1917-1948* (London: Frank Cass, 1983), pp. 71 and 85.
97. Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, pp. 69 and 93; see also G. Sheffer, "Intentions and Results of British Policy in Palestine: Passfield's White Paper," *Middle Eastern Studies* 9, no. 1 (January 1973), pp. 52-53.
98. Cmd. 3692, Statement of Policy.
99. *A Survey of Palestine: Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry*, Vols. I, II, and Supplement (Palestine: Government Printer, 1946), p. 28.
100. The article is reprinted in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Vol. I, Series B, paper 120, pp. 605-606.
101. Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, p. 70, p. 93 note 68, citing minutes of the Joint Meeting of Zionist Executive with Special Political Committee, 1 December 1930. In fact Weizmann was seeking to extend the scope of Zionist colonization also to southern Lebanon and Syria. He was party to the WZO plan, submitted to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, to this end. In 1934 Weizmann tried to interest the French authorities in his settlement plan in Syria and Lebanon. See Weizmann's letter to Adelaide Cohen, April 1934, in *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, Vol. 17, p. 29.
102. Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, p. 70, p. 93 note 69.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 93 note 69.
104. Quoted in Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs*, pp. 108-9, 211.
105. The same proposal was also repeated at the Directorate meeting of 29 April 1931. Central Zionist Archives, Minutes of the JNF Directorate, cited in Raya Adler (Cohen), "Mandatory Land Policy, Tenancy and the Wadi al-Hawarith Affair, 1929-1933," *Studies in Zionism* 7, no. 2 (1986), p. 249, note 60.
106. See letter from Lewis Andrews to First Secretary, 10 July 1932, and letter from Arthur Wauchope to Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Colonial Secretary, 22 July 1933, in PRO CO. 733/231/17249. There is also a hint about this Jewish Agency proposal in Shertok's statement at the Jewish Agency Executive meeting on 29 November 1937. See Moshe Sharett,

*Yoman Medini* 1936-38 [Political Diary], Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: 'Am 'Oved, 1971), p. 435.

107. Shmuel Dotan, *The Struggle for the Land of Israel* (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: 1981), pp. 76-77.
108. *Doar Hayom* (Jerusalem), 28 April 1930. See also *Sefer Ussishkin* [The Book of Ussishkin] (Jerusalem: 1934), pp. 233-37. The Zionist historian Louis Lipsky wrote of Ussishkin: "There were many obstinate Zionists in the early days but none had his arrogance. He was rude and despotic, paternal and sentimental....Had he been asked he would have said he could not stomach the Arabs or the English. He ignored them both as long as possible." L. Lipsky, *A Gallery of Zionist Profiles* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956), p. 74.
109. Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948*, p. 242.
110. Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, p. 82.